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2The market sends out incorrect signals to the participants in the fishery. Input
controls constitute an attempt to address the problem by making it difficult for
participants to respond to incorrect market signals. Output controls, on the other
hand, change the market signals themselves.
G.R. Munro and A.D. Scott (1985, p 661)
1. Introduction
In what is now a classic in the fisheries economics literature, Munro and Scott (1985)
divided the economic problems of fisheries into class I problems, where the absence
of regulation results in dissipation of rent, and class II problems where authorities set
a total allowable catch (TAC), but fail to prevent crowding and the race to fish that
result in rent dissipation. After reviewing the outcomes of fisheries regulations,
especially in Canada, their insight was to suggest the use of individual transferable
quotas (ITQs) that they foresaw would both change the incentives of fishers and help
prevent rent dissipation.
In the 20 years since their work, ITQs have been applied in a large number of
fisheries in several different countries, including Canada (Kaufmann et al. 1999),
New Zealand and Iceland (Hannesson 2004). Despite the apparent success of ITQs in
delivering substantial economic benefits (Fox et al. 2003; Grafton 1996; Grafton et al.
2000; Shotton 2001; Weninger 1997) these advantages have largely been identified in
so-called ‘single-species’ fisheries, where fishers are able to target particularly species
of fish. What is less clear is whether the difficulties and complexities of managing
multi-species fisheries (Holland and Maguire 2003) mean that ITQs can not be
adopted for such fisheries (Boyce 1996) with similar success.
One of the perceived problems associated with multispecies fisheries includes
discarding at sea (Anderson 1994; Arnason 1994; Boyce 1996). Although this
problem also exists even in the absence of ITQs, quota systems can also induce
discarding at sea (Copes 1986; Turner 1997). Indeed, even in so-called single species
fisheries this problem exists, although the regulatory system simply ignores the issue
by excluding bycatch and discards from the management regime. Perhaps more
problematic is that if fishers have a jointness-in-inputs technology (Kohli 1983), such
that they have no ability to separately target species, their catch mix may not match
their quota allocation. A limited ability to target individual species could also
contribute to undesirable quota underages and overages, and may severely constrain
economic returns if total harvests are limited to protect vulnerable species, or lead to
unsustainable harvesting of some stocks if managers ignore the bycatch or discarding
3issues (Squires et al. 1998). Although some types of technology or gear, such as
longlines, provide greater flexibility in catching individual species than other types of
gear, such as trawls (Squires and Kirkley 1991), all fishers can to some extent adjust
their fishing behaviour to increase their ability to target fish.
Using insights from the British Columbia (BC) groundfish trawl fishery, managed by
ITQs since 1997, we show that with the appropriate incentives fisher behaviour can be
modified to meet the twin goals of sustainability and economic efficiency. We also
argue that an ITQ system can be effectively implemented in a multi-species fishery
that includes over 55 distinct quotas while also addressing the discarding issue, equity
issues and improving economic returns and sustainability. The experience of the BC
groundfish trawl fishery demonstrates that the common property problem can be
overcome if the incentives can be changed. The approach adopted in this fishery has
been to change the incentives that, in turn, modify fisher behaviour. The end result
has been a transformation from a ‘race to the fish’ mentality towards one oriented
towards reducing costs, maximising value, and improving management.
The implications for multi-species fisheries management are significant. If the basic
management approaches used in the BC groundfish trawl industry can be effectively
applied elsewhere they have the potential to both mitigate sustainability challenges
and raise resource rent. More generally, we argue that the lessons learned apply to
single-species fisheries as well, and that the issue of discards and bycatches should be
incorporated into the management regime to improve both the sustainability as well as
the economic performance of the fishery.
The chapter is divided as follows. First, a description of the BC groundfish trawl
fishery and the management regime in place prior to the introduction of the ITQs in
1997 is provided. This is followed with a detailed discussion of the current ITQ
system and how the management program has helped to develop the ‘right’ incentives
for promoting sustainability and enhanced economic benefits from fishing. The
experiences of this fishery show that ITQs have contributed to conservation
objectives, led to substantially improved profitability, and improved the collection of
scientific information to help regulate the fishery. Several unique features of the ITQ
system designed to address concerns over concentration of quota ownership and the
associated distributional effects on processors, coastal communities, and
crewmembers are also reviewed.
42. The BC Groundfish Trawl Fishery
To  understand what the incentive approach to fisheries management has achieved in
the Groundfish Trawl Fishery (GTF) we first review the major features of the fishery
and its history.
Background
The GTF is the largest wild fishery in terms of both the value and total catch in
British Columbia (Gislason 2004) that lands about 100,000 metric tonnes of fish per
year worth some CDN$ 60-70 million (see Table 1). The harvest consists of dozens of
different species caught exclusively off the BC Coast. Important species in terms of
catch are rockfish, hake, Pacific cod, thornyheads, sole and lingcod (halibut are
excluded as they fall under a separate licensed fishery).  In terms of volume, the
single largest species caught is hake that accounts for about twice as much in terms of
landed weight than the catch of all other species combined. However, its price of 7 to
10 cents per pound is much less than the average 50-60 cents per pound received for
other species. Other fish harvested by the trawl fleet also include sablefish, dogfish,
turbot, skate, flounder and other groundfish. Management is also complicated by the
fact that many species caught in the fishery have location–specific populations
although some, such as sablefish and hake, can be harvested over the entire BC
Coast.1
Fish are caught in trawl nets that may extend as much as 1500 metres behind the
vessel. Depending upon the species, fishers may harvest along the ocean floor for
many rockfish and other groundfish, while hake, pollock, and some rockfish species
(i.e., greenies and brownies) are targeted with mid-water trawls. All species can be
harvested year round, although there can be seasonal variations as well as annual
fluctuations in relative abundance.
The large number of species that can be caught poses various difficulties for the
industry. First, there is the complexity inherent in determining stock sizes and
abundance for dozens of species. Second, the challenge exists to reconcile, within an
ITQ system, the actual catches to initial fisher allocations plus net trades. Third, the
problem of ensuring stocks are protected from unreported discarding, while at the
same time allowing fishers to harvest up to the sustainable catch levels.
5Historical Development of the Fishery
A commercial groundfish trawl fishery has existed in BC for over 60 years. In the
early 1960s the fishery consisted of 80 trawlers, of which about half were operated on
a full-time basis.  In the mid-1960s foreign fleets arrived in BC waters, initially
targeting Pacific Ocean Perch, and then hake. By the early 1970s, the catch of foreign
fleets was significantly higher than the Canadian harvest for a number of key species.
In 1977 Canada extended its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles, and since then foreign
fishing has been phased out.
In 1960 a key report was released on the state of BC fisheries that recommended the
use of vessel licensing to help prevent the further expansion of fishing effort (Sinclair
1960). In 1969 limited entry licensing was implemented in the commercial salmon
fishery. In 1976 limited licensing was introduced into the GTF in the form of
groundfish trawl T licenses. T licenses were allocated to 142 vessels that were allowed
harvest multiple species, and permitted fishers to catch groundfish anywhere along the
Canadian west coast. The licenses also created categories of prohibited species
(halibut, salmon and herring) that fishers were not allowed to keep, as well as
permitted species. A limited entry L license (by hook & line gear) for halibut was
implemented in 1979 followed by limited entry K licenses (by hook & line and trap
gear) in 1981 for sablefish.  The groundfish trawl fleet was allocated 8.75% of the
annual sablefish TAC.  During the late 1970s the fishing fleet experienced a
significant expansion due to favourable tax treatment and price subsidies designed to
replace the effort formerly undertaken by foreign vessels in Canada’s exclusive
economic zone.
Despite the significant increase in landings in the 1970s, low prices, persistent
unprofitability, and a significant amount of idle capacity characterised the GTF. The
proposed remedy was given in a 1982 Royal Commission Report that recommended
that 10 year quotas be established for groundfish species, individually where they
were targeted separately, and issued by zone, with temporary permits issued on a
year-to-year basis to handle fluctuations in stock abundance (Pearse 1982, 130-132).
Unfortunately, none of the recommendations were implemented, and the groundfish
trawl fleet continued to expand its harvesting capacity and overall harvest levels as
                                                                                                                                           
1 For example, there are five distinct stocks of Pacific Ocean perch fished; one on the
lower West Coast of Vancouver Island and another on the Upper West Coast, Hecate
Strait, the West Coast of Queen Charlottes and Queen Charlotte Sound.
6predicted by Munro and Scott in their description of the class II common property
problem.
Prior to the establishment of ITQs in the fishery in 1997, the TACs for individual
species in the fishery were specified for the whole of BC by adding individual sub-
stock TACs together. The annual species TACs were also divided into four quarters,
corresponding to a 12-month fishing season. Within the overall season were monthly
fishing periods, and vessels could choose different fishing options (2, 4 or 15 trips per
month) with vessel trip limits for each species. The trip limits were calculated by
estimating fishing effort for the quarter and were reduced accordingly as the total
landed catch approached the quarterly TAC. The trip limit was also related to the
fishing option chosen by fishers such that more trips per month option had smaller trip
limits. These individual trip allocations were non-transferable. Indeed, the incentives
for misreporting and discarding were magnified by the fact there were individual
species limits and, thus, fishers were obliged to curtail their trip if they exceeded just
one of their individual limits out of the many species harvested on a trip. As trip limits
were reduced, the problems of misreporting and discarding worsened.
In addition to trip limits and TACs on individual species, each fisher also faced
various vessel and gear restrictions that included regulations on vessel size, gear and
the ability to combine multiple T licenses on one vessel. Fishers were also required to
maintain daily fishing logs recording their catch, and the regulator introduced 100%
monitoring of all landed catch by independent dockside monitors.
Despite these controls harvests consistently exceeded coast-wide TACs for a number
of species in the 1990s, and fisheries managers increasingly had to specify shorter trip
limits in order to control effort. As fishing trip duration declined, the ability of fishers
to modify their fishing operations to avoid reaching individual species limits
diminished, magnifying the incentive to discard overages and bycatch. In addition to
the impact on the sustainability of some stocks, the costs of fishing were also rising
and increased the ‘race to fish’. Moreover, the landed value of fish declined because
of reduced quality and because an increased proportion of fish were sold as a frozen
product due to the ever shortening fishing season.
The key difficulty faced by fishery managers was how to manage the stocks in the
absence of reliable information on stock specific harvesting at sea and the level of
discarding (Walters and Bonfil 1998). One of the principal problems identified at the
time was that stocks could not be managed on a stock specific basis as reporting by
fishers had little or no credibility. Moreover, there was no ability to assess whether or
7not harvests were being taken out of a specific area, potentially endangering
vulnerable sub-stocks. Given the lack of information, there was also much uncertainty
over stock assessments, and in response to this uncertainty, fishery managers
increasingly took a precautionary approach to management by setting lower TACs in
the belief that the current TACs were likely to be exceeded. By 1995, the official
catch exceeded the coastwide TACs for several species. As a result, fishery managers
took the unprecedented action of closing the entire GTF in September 1995. 2
The groundfish trawl fishery reopened in February of 1996 with 100% at-sea observer
coverage.3 This addressed the concerns of stock specific management and discarding
as fisheries managers now had, for the first time, a reliable means of quantifying
discards and identifying where the fish were coming from, reducing the main sources
of uncertainty in managing within TACs. The fishery could now be managed on a
stock specific basis rather than on a coast-wide basis.
3.  Establishment of ITQs in the BC Groundfish Trawl Fishery
To address the economic problems of the fishery, fishers agreed to implement what
was initially a trial of ITQs in April 1997. As part of the negotiations over allocation
of quota that included a range of interests (crew, shoreworkers, processors, fishing
communities and licence holders) only 80% of the species TACs were allocated to T
licence holders. The remaining 20% was placed under the purview of a newly created
non-profit society called the Groundfish Development Authority (GDA) charged with
promoting regional development, market and employment objectives, sustainable
fishing practices and fair and safe treatment of fishing crews.
Allocation and Transferability
                                                
2 It should be noted that other high profile fisheries in Canada, most noticeably the
East Coast cod fishery and the West Coast salmon fishery, had recently run into
highly publicised problems with low returns and in fact, the Fraser River sockeye
salmon run (the most important in the province) had been shut down in August, only a
month earlier.
3 Some fisheries have only partial observer at sea coverage, such as halibut, sablefish,
schedule II fisheries and a localised in-shore fishery within the trawl fishery (Option
B fishery).
8The TACs were first divided between trawl and hook and line gear for rockfish,
lingcod, and dogfish. The allocation of ITQ within the TACs for trawlers was then
made on the basis of catch history and vessel length. All groundfish were converted
into groundfish equivalents (GFEs) in order to make different species comparable.4
Trawlers then received proportionate shares across all species and stock
combinations.5  This resulted in 55 different ITQ allocations all expressed as a
percentage of the respective stock TAC (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2004).
Under the ITQ rules, vessels are permitted to fish up to their allocation (which can
also include carryover from the previous year) of a species within an area for stock
specific allocations. If they exceed their allocation for the area they will not be
permitted to continue fishing unless additional ITQs for that species are transferred
onto the vessel to cover the overage. If the species in question is delineated as a coast-
wide ITQ then the vessel is not permitted to bottom trawl anywhere and for any
species until enough quota for the species in question is transferred to cover the
overage.
Individual vessels are also permitted to retain fish caught in excess of their allocation
and apply it to their next year’s ITQ, although there are annual overage limits. They
may also carry over underages into the next year. However, this underage expires at
the end of the next year, and thus cannot be accumulated. The maximum underage
and overage is 37.5% for all groundfish species other than hake and halibut for which
the limit is 15%. There are also overall individual species cap set (between 4 and
10%) and a total holdings cap set limiting the amount of quota (based on groundfish
equivalents) any vessel owner can accumulate in a particular species or in general on
the vessel.6
Fishers also have individual halibut bycatch quotas even though they are not
permitted to retain halibut. There is an overall mortality bycatch cap assigned to the
fishery of one million lbs for which each individual vessel owner receives a
proportionate share. This is freely transferable although no license holder can
accumulate more than 4% of the total and, as is the case for individual species
                                                
4 Pacific Ocean Perch (POP) was used to establish the baseline (so the price of POP is
set to equal 1.0).
5 Hake were excluded, but followed the same principles although the weighting-70%
history for catch and 30% for vessel length was the same (although it was for hake
vessels only).
6 The total holding cap is determined using groundfish equivalents to compare
different stock-species allocations.
9allocations, fishers cannot continue fishing bottom trawl when they have exceeded
their cap until they acquire more. In addition to the halibut bycatch, fish discarded at
sea that are considered marketable are deducted from each vessel allocation, while
non-marketable fish are recorded, but not counted against the ITQ. Mortality rates for
fish caught and discarded are calculated based on the species and other factors, such
as towing time.
There is an active market in transferring quota with over 2700 trades made among 70
boats annually. The transferability rules are determined on an ongoing basis and are
reviewed every three years.  The main concern addressed in designing the
transferability rules has been the prevention of concentration of quota and an
expressed desire to see quota stay on ‘active’ vessels. Quota can only be transferred
between licensed trawl vessels. While quota is freely transferable, there are
restrictions on how much can be transferred between vessels because of limits on how
much can be accumulated on any one boat due to the individual species caps and total
holdings limit.
The current rules require that 25% of the ITQ be ‘locked’ on to the vessel for three
years (2004-2006) unless permanently transferred off, while 75% of the ITQ is freely
transferable on a temporary basis within the year (this quota returns to the vessel
owner at the start on the next fishing season).  Each vessel license is allowed 2 one-
way permanent transfers of locked on ITQ during a 3-year period. As is the case for
total holdings cap, this is measured using groundfish equivalents to make different
species quotas comparable.
Addressing distributional concerns
In addition to quota concentration, there were also concerns expressed about the
impact of quota trading on both crew members and those communities that were
either home ports to fishers or had processing facilities. These concerns were
addressed through the development of the Code of Conduct Quota (CCQ) and the
Groundfish Development Quota (GDQ).
The CCQ consists of the 10% of each TAC that is automatically allocated to
individual trawl licensed vessels based on the ITQ allocation formula, provided the
Groundfish Development Authority (GDA) has not been advised that a specific vessel
receive less than their full CCQ allocation. The CCQ is designed to shelter
crewmembers from unfairly absorbing any of the costs associated with the
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introduction of the ITQ system and to limit, to some extent, the ability of vessel
owners to reduce crew size. In addition, licence owners of vessels are required to
satisfy ‘safe vessel’ criteria to prevent changes in crew size or maintenance due to
ITQs that might compromise the safety of the vessel. Any crew member who feels
that their rights have been violated can complain to the GDA, but to date there have
been no complaints filed. The lack of complaints, however, may be partially
explained by the fact that crew members who report a vessel owner will also suffer
financially as the total allocation for the vessel will be reduced by 10%, thereby
reducing their crew share.
The GDQ has also 10% of each groundfish trawl TAC allocated by the Groundfish
Development Authority (GDA) based on proposals jointly prepared by processors and
trawl licensed vessel owners. The GDA administers both the CCQ and GDQ. The
GDA was the compromise negotiated in response to requests by processors, unions
and coastal communities for direct ITQ allocations. Its Board of Directors is drawn
from those stakeholder groups, but vessel owners active in the fishery are excluded.
There is also a steering group that provides information and expertise to the board
made up of processors, vessel owners, a government representative, and a First
Nations representative
The GDQ is allocated based on the amount of ITQ fish in the proposal, processor
production history, and the rating of the proposal. Criteria used for evaluation include
market stabilisation, maintenance of existing processing capacity, employment
stabilisation, benefits to local communities, increasing the value of groundfish
production, job-training and sustainable fishing practice.
Financial Responsibilities & Rent Capture
The shift towards the ITQ system has also seen a change in the roles and obligations
of industry and government. Overall direct costs to industry of managing the fishery
are approximately $CDN 4 million annually (this excludes government expenditures
on management, enforcement and science), or about 6% of the total landed value of
fish harvested in the GTF. The government currently picks up one-third of the cost of
data management with the industry paying two-thirds of the cost. The expense of
maintaining on-board observers at sea, approximately CDN$300/day, is paid for by
vessel owners. The annual cost of at-sea and dockside monitoring is approximately
CDN$3 million while annual industry-funded science activities cost CDN$800,000,
and GDA expenses are CDN$80,000 per year. The federal government also collects
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license fees worth, in total, some CDN$800,000 annually while prior to ITQs the
government annually collected CDN$1,420 in license fees (DFO 2004).
4. Economic and Sustainability Effects of ITQs
The potential economic benefits of ITQs include fresh fish year round, increased
values, less loss of gear, lower quota overage and bycatch discards, and increased
safety at sea (Dupont and Grafton 2001). Offsetting these benefits are increased
management and enforcement costs and distributional concerns around the reduction
in crew sizes. In their study of the Alaska sablefish fishery in which ITQs were
introduced, Sigler and Lunson (2001) found that the fishing season lengthened and
that catching efficiency improved. As well, selective fishing techniques were
introduced, reducing bottom damage, and there was a reduction in catching of smaller
immature fish and related discards.
As yet, there has not been a detailed economic assessment of the impact of ITQs on
the BC groundfish trawl fishery. The available evidence, however, points to both
improved profitability and changed fishing patterns and effort. Prior to the
introduction of ITQs there were 142 limited entry licenses of which 115 to 135 boats
would be active, depending upon the year. After the introduction of the ITQs, there
still remain 142 T license holders, but there are now only about 60-70 boats operating.
Both the very small boats (under 50 feet) and larger boats have exited the fishery. The
smaller boats exited because of the cost of an observer at sea meant smaller-scale
fishing was no longer profitable, while the larger boats exited because they had been
designed for larger volumes and longer trips, but were not as profitable operating with
smaller volumes taken over a long period of time.
The most significant change with the advent of ITQs has been in terms of fisher
behaviour. This has manifested itself in several different ways. First, under the earlier
regime, in order to maximise their catch fishers were forced to fish in all areas. This
occurred because there was no incentive to individually withhold effort from an area
given the possibility of the area TAC being reached and then closed to fishing. Thus
harvesters would try to fish every area to ensure that they gained some catch before
the limit was reached. Under the ITQ system, however, fishers have chosen to
specialise both in regions and species. Figure 1 illustrates the significant reduction in
nominal effort (total hours fished at sea) that has taken place since the introduction of
the quota. There has also been the development of customised ‘shopping lists’, based
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on market demand, and fishers have been making shorter trips to improve the quality
of the fish.
Sustainability
One of the most important changes in terms of sustainability has been the change in
fishing practices. Prior to the ITQ system, there was no reliable data on discards.
Under the new management system the presence of on-board monitors, introduced
independently of ITQs, ensures that discards are reliably estimated. As a result, stock
assessments and the setting of TACs can be made with much more accurate data.
In addition to improved information, mortality rates on quota species are also assessed
on fish released at sea that are considered marketable, and these count against the
quota owned or leased by fishers. As a result fishers now face an economic
disincentive to discard catch, and economic incentives to minimise bycatch and avoid
ITQ overages. Fishers have several alternatives when they do exceed their limits —
they can purchase quota, borrow from their quota next year, or shut down, but all of
these cost money that provide an economic signal to avoid catching unwanted species.
This policy of counting discards against quota allocations has given fishers the
impetus to be much more selective in their fishing practices. For example, many
fishers no longer target Pacific Ocean perch, sablefish, silvergray, and canary rockfish
as such species are caught incidentally when targeting other species. Consequently,
fishers reserve their fishing effort and quota for preferred species that can be targeted
effectively.
Table 2 shows discard ratios for selected species that are the at-sea releases (both
marketable and unmarketable) divided by the landed weight. For all five species
shown, this ratio drops as fishers have learned over time to fish more selectively. In
some cases the drop in at-sea releases to retained catch is dramatic such as for spiny
dogfish where discards as a proportion of the retained catch were in 2003/04 about
5% of what they were in 1997/98. This change is not because of the observer
monitoring at sea as full monitoring began in 1996, but is a direct result of
adjustments by fishers as to when, where, and for how long they trawl so as to ensure
that bycatches of non-targeted species do not prevent them from fishing. However, the
at-sea monitoring is critical to ensure that the proper economic incentives are in place.
In addition to helping the sustainability of the groundfish species that fall within the
GTF management system, changed fishing practices in response to economic
incentives, have also reduced the annual bycatch mortality for halibut to about 15% of
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it previous level, dropping from around 900 MT to a little over 100 MT since the
introduction of ITQs.7
Fishers have been able to more selectively harvest in several different ways. First,
there is greater communication between vessels advising each other not to fish in
certain areas where there is a high incidence of unwanted species.8 Second, fishers
have changed their behaviour, using shorter tows and more frequent checking of the
net, as well as test tows to see what they encounter before actually fishing. Third,
fishers have also invested in technology (electronic equipment that allows them to
vary the net opening while trawling) as well as net mensuration gear (remote sensors
that transmit what is being caught and how much is in the net). Finally, harvesters are
experimenting with their gear (nets, bridles, footropes, headropes, lengthening pieces,
doors, and codends) to improve selectivity.
The better information generated by the industry in terms of discard mortality also
provides for improved stock assessments that, in turn, feed backs into better
management. For example, the BC longspine thornyhead quota was initially
established at an unsustainable level because of insufficient information regarding the
status of the fish stocks. Since the introduction of ITQs, however, managers have been
able to work closely with industry to collect improved information that has allowed
managers to redo their stock assessments and reduce the TAC to sustainable levels.
Indeed, the ability to use better information to improve the management is one of the
most important outcomes of the ITQ system, and is recognised as such by fishers
(Haigh and Shute 2003).
Economic Outcomes
The introduction of ITQs into the fishery has allowed more profitable fishers to
purchase quota from less profitable operators. This has led to a consolidation in quota
holdings and catches per vessel as shown in Table 3 along with about a 50% reduction
in ‘active’ fishing vessels.
                                                
7 We note here, however, that despite the presence of another market for halibut
quota, that this halibut is discarded, forgoing potential revenues, suggesting that there
is still room for improvement in terms of integrating the two quota systems.
8 This information sharing also appears in other fisheries (Platteau and Seki 2002). It
is interesting to speculate to what extent such co-operation emerges in response to
changes in incentives from moving to different management regimes.
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In addition to a change in the overall number of vessels, the composition of the fleet
has also changed with the smallest and largest vessels exiting and greater
specialisation for remaining vessels in terms of their use of mid or bottom trawls,
harvesting in deep or shallow water, landing fresh versus frozen fish, and choice of
fishing locales.
Greater specialisation and quota consolidation has led to improved economic
outcomes for vessels within the fleet. These benefits are manifested in a number of
ways, such as increased output prices, because fish is now landed over a much longer
period of time and in better quality or form (fresh rather than frozen). Figure 2 shows
the significant difference in trends between landed values and volumes after the
introduction of quota, with overall fleet revenues increasing despite the reduced
harvest. The market has recognised these increased returns with a doubling in the
average lease price for quota and in quota values over the period 1997/98 to
2003/2004, as shown in Table 4. These increases have come despite a fully funded at-
sea and dockside monitoring program and increased license fees. In addition, the 10%
set aside of the TACs each for Code of Conduct Quota and Groundfish Development
Quota has allowed some of the benefits of ITQs to accrue to crew, some of whom
own quota, as well as processors.
5. Concluding Remarks
It is some twenty years since Munro and Scott identified the key factors in successful
fisheries management as the market signals and incentives faced by fishers. Their
insight has been adopted and applied in a wide range of fisheries with the use of
individual output controls.
Using the experiences of the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery — a
multispecies fishery with 55 separate quotas — it is clear that the ‘incentive principle’
of Munro and Scott can help address some of the most vexatious problems in fisheries
management: discarding at sea, overages of bycatch species, and how to obtain
reliable catch information for stock assessment purposes. By creating a quota for
bycatch, even though the species have no or little market value, fisheries managers
did give them an economic value. Fishers have then responded to the economic
incentives that were created. Under an effective monitoring system, they have
adjusted their behaviour as to when, where and how they use their fishing gear to
mitigate the discard problem. As a result, the fishery is much better managed than
prior to the introduction of individual harvesting rights. Equally as important,
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transferability of individual quota has allowed more profitable operators to increase
their share of the total catch. It has also allowed for greater specialisation by fishers
that has contributed to a doubling in quota values since the introduction of incentive-
based management in 1997.
The key lesson from the experiences of the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery
is to adaptively manage fisheries and set incentives such that fisher behaviour matches
the goals required for a profitable and sustainable industry. The experiences of the
British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery show that the insights of Munro and Scott
regarding incentive-based management, implemented with adequate monitoring and
operational tools, provides a powerful combination to help resolve the class II
common property problem and the challenges of multi-species fisheries management.
16
References
Anderson, L. 1994. Highgrading in ITQ Fisheries. Marine Resource Economics 9:
209-226.
Arnason, R. 1994. On Catch discarding in Fisheries. Marine Resource Economics 9:
189-208.
Boyce, J. R. 1996. An Economic Analysis of the Fisheries Bycatch Problem. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 31: 314-336.
Copes. P. 1986. A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a device in Fisheries
Management. Land Economics 62: 278-291.
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). 2004. Pacific Region Integrated Fisheries
Management Plan-Groundfish Trawl (April 1, 2004 to March 31, 2005). Accessed
at dfo-mpo.gc.ca
Dupont, D. P. and Grafton, R. Q. 2001. Multi-Species Individual Transferable Quotas:
The Scotia-Fundy Mobile Gear Groundfishery. Marine Resource Economics 15:
205-220.
Fox, K. J., Grafton, R. Q., Kirkley, J. and Squires, D. 2003. Property Rights in a
Fishery: regulatory Change and Firm Performance. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 46: 156-177.
Gislason, G. S. and Associates. 2004. The BC wild fisheries. Mimeograph, 2004.
Grafton, R.Q. 1995. Rent Capture in a Rights-Based Fishery. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 25: 48-67.
Grafton, R. Q. 1996. Individual Transferable Quotas: Theory and Practice. Reviews in
Fish Biology and Fisheries 6: 5-20.
Grafton, R. Q., R.Q., Squires D. and Fox, K. J. 2000. Private Property and Economic
Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource. The Journal of Law and
Economics 43(2): 679-712.
Groundfish Trawl Special Industry. 2002.  Committee Review of the Groundfish
Trawl Management Program: Summary Report, March.
Groundfish Special Industry Committee. 2003. Review of the Groundfish
Development Authority: An Element of the IVQ / GDA Program in the BC
Groundfish Trawl Fishery Final Report and Recommendations.
Hannesson, R. 2004. The Privatization of the Oceans. The MIT Press: Cambridge,
MA.
17
Holland, D., and Maguire, J. 2003. Optimal effort controls for the multispecies
groundfish complex in New England: What might have been. Canadian Journal of
Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 60(2): 159.
Kaufmann, B., Geen, G, and Sen, S. 1999. Fish Futures: Individual Transferable
Quotas in Fisheries, Fisheries Economics, Research and Management Ltd.: Kiama,
Australia.
Kohli, U. 1983. Non-joint Technologies. Review of Economic Studies 50: 209-219.
Munro, G. R. and Scott, A. D. 1985. The Economics of Fisheries Management, in
(A.V. Kneese and J.L. Sweeney Eds.) Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy
Economics Volume II, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Pearse, P. H. 1982. Turning the Tide: a New Policy for Canada’s Pacific Fisheries.
The Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy Final Report, Catalogue No. Fs23-
18/1982E, Supply and Services, Canada: Ottawa.
Platteau, J., and Seki, E. 2002. Community arrangements to overcome market
failure:  pooling groups in Japanese fisheries. in Aoki, M., and Y, Hayami
(eds.) Communities and markets in economic development . Oxford
University Press. Oxford.
 Haigh, R. and Shute, J. T. 2003. The Longspine Thornyhead Fishery along the West
Coast of Vancouver Island, British Columbia, Canada: Portrait of a Developing
Fishery. North American Journal of Fisheries Management 23:120-140.
Shotton, R. 2001. Case Studies on the Effects of Transferable Fishing Rights on Fleet
Capacity and Concentration of Quota Ownership. FAO Technical Paper 412:
Rome.
Sigler, M., and Lunsford, C. 2001. Effects of individual quotas on catching efficiency
and spawning potential in the Alaska sablefish fishery. Canadian Journal of
Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 58(7): 1300-1312.
Sinclair, D. 1960. License Limitation — British Columbia. Report to the Department
of Fisheries and Oceans, Pacific Region.
Squires, D., Campbell, H., Cunningham, S., Dewees, C., Grafton, R. Q., Herrick Jr, S.
F., Kirkley, J., Pascoe, S., Salvanes, K., Shallard, B., Turris, B. and Vestergaard
N. 1998. Individual transferable quotas in multispecies fisheries. Marine Policy
22(2): 135-159.
Squires, D. and Kirkley, J. E. 1991. The Potential Effects of Individual Transferable
Quotas in a Pacific Fishery. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 21: 109-126.
Turner, M. A. 1997. Quota-Induced Discarding in Heterogeneous Fisheries. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 33: 186-195.
18
Walters, C. J. and Bonfil, R. 1999. Multispecies spatial assessment models for the
British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and
Aquatic Sciences 56: 601-628.
Weninger, Q. 1998. Assessing Efficiency Gains from Individual Transferable Quotas:
An Application to the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80: 750-764.
19
Table 1: Quantity (thousands of tonnes) and Value of Landings (nominal values in
Canadian dollars) in the British Columbia Trawl Fishery 1993-2002
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Landings
(000 MT) 122.6 164.6 121.3 138.0 129.3 129.5 124.0 58.3 92.9 98.1
Landed
Value
(CDN$
millions) 42 50 45 42 48 57 62 58 57 66
Source: G. S. Gislason & Associates
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Table 2: Proportion of At-Sea Releases to Retained Catch for TAC Managed
Species in the BC Groundfish Trawl Fishery, Selected Species for years 1997-
2004
Year
Species 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
Pacific
Ocean Perch
0.028 0.024 0.016 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.012
Yellowmouth 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
Redstripe
Rockfish
0.316 0.342 0.206 0.122 0.113 0.097 0.132
Shortspine
Thornyheads
0.065 0.062 0.049 0.049 0.043 0.042 0.030
Spiny
Dogfish
0.46 0.123 0.30 0.09 0.044 0.034 0.025
N.B.:
The 2003/2004 data only includes reports up to February 3, 2004.
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Table 3: Landings Per Vessel, Selected Years 1994-2000
Landings per
Vessel (lbs)
1994 1998 2000
> 1 million 53% 68% 82%
0.5-1.0 million 36% 21% 13%
< 0.5 million 11% 11% 5%
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Table 4: Lease and Quota Prices in British Columbia Trawl Fishery
Year Lease Price (CDN$ per lb) Quota Price (CDN$ per lb)
1997/98 $0.10 $1.50
1998/99 $0.12 $1.50
1999/2000 $0.14 $1.75
2000/2001 $0.20 $2.00
2001/2002 $0.18-0.20 $2.00-$2.50
2002/2003 $.20 n.a.
2003/2004 $.20 $3.00
N.B.:
n.a = not available
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Figure 1. Groundfish harvest (000 tonnes) and Effort (thousand hours) in the BC
Groundfish Trawl Fishery 1980-2002.
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Figure 2. Groundfish Harvest (tonnes) by the Trawl Fishery and Landed Value
(Nominal CDN$ millions), 1993-2002
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